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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of housework on wages
for women and men in Sweden using both linear and non-linear specifica-
tions of the effect. Furthermore, we investigate the effort and selection hy-
potheses, i.e. whether the effect of housework on wages can be explained
by reduced effort and/or selection into jobs which are more compatible with
housework. Three methods are applied: OLS, IV regressions and propensity
score matching. The latter two methods are used in attempt to reduce po-
tential endogeneity of housework. We find weak support for the effort and
selection hypotheses but there is a statistically significant wage penalty for
women in the linear specification, while the effect for men is less pronounced.
However, in the upper part of the housework scale, which is captured in the
non-linear specification, the result is somewhat reversed in that performing
housework 18 hours or more per week penalise the wages of men more than
those of women. We discuss our results in relation to potential endogeneity of
housework, which is an important, although often neglected, issue through-
out previous literature on the subject.
Key words: Housework, wages, endogeneity, instrumental variables,
matching methods.
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Introduction
Housework is an essential part of most people’s life, whether we want it to
be or not. Traditionally, women have taken the main responsibility of house-
hold tasks while men have engaged in market work in order to economically
support the family. The sexual division of labour is evidently nowadays not
as divided as it used to be. In Sweden, the female labour force participation
is high and most men know how to operate a laundry machine. However,
women still do more housework than men and have lower wages on average.
The sample used in this study1 show that women spend on average 13 hours
a week on housework compared to 8 hours for men.2 Furthermore, there is a
persistent gender wage gap around 13 % in favour of men in Sweden (Boye
et al. 2014).3
Several studies (e.g. Hersch 1991a; Hersch and Stratton 2002; Bryan and
Sevilla-Sanz 2011) have found a negative effect of housework on wages, an
effect that is more pronounced for women than for men. The main underly-
ing theory of why housework affects wages negatively originates from Becker
(1985) who formulated, what we call, the effort hypothesis and the selec-
tion hypothesis. The effort hypothesis stipulates that executing housework
takes effort and thus leaves less effort available for market work which con-
sequently lowers wages. The selection hypothesis stipulates that because
women do more housework they also seek jobs which are more compatible
with housework, in turn these jobs pay less because of compensating differen-
tials. Despite a more or less intuitive theory, the relation between housework
and wages is difficult to entangle because of endogeneity of housework which
stems from simultaneous causality and unobserved characteristics which de-
termine both variables. These circumstances are expected to cause a down-
ward bias on the estimated effect of housework on wages in a standard OLS
regression, i.e. result in a more negative effect than is actually the case. An-
other aspect of the housework-wage relation is that the effect may start when
1 The sample is from the Swedish survey LNU 2010. See data section from more details.
2 Housework is defined as hours per week spent on cleaning, doing laundry, cooking, food
shopping and doing the dishes, a further discussion on the construction of this variable
is found in the data section. The difference in means is statistically significant at the
1% level, see Appendix A.
3 Calculated using the same data as this thesis and adjusted experience, seniority, sector
and qualification level.
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the time spent on housework is above a certain level since some amount of
housework is a necessary part of most people’s life, an argument in line with
Hersch (1991a) and Stratton (2001).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of time spent on house-
work on wages for women and men in Sweden. The purpose can be separated
into three parts. First, we examine the linear relationship between housework
and wages and whether there is support for the effort and selection hypothe-
ses. Second, additional insight into the relationship is provided through a
threshold analysis. That is, we specify a non-linear specification which cap-
tures the effect of housework above a certain amount of hours spent. Third,
we attempt to capture the casual effect of housework on wages by taking the
potential endogeneity of housework into account.
The data used in this study comes from a Swedish survey called the level-
of-living survey (LNU) from 2010. The data include wage and self-assessed
time spent on housework, among many other individual characteristics and
assessments. In order to examine the relationship between housework and
wages, three methods are applied: ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumen-
tal variable (IV) regression and propensity score matching. The two latter
methods are used in attempt to reduce the potential endogeneity of house-
work in the linear and non-linear specification, respectively.
Our results show that there is a statistically significant negative association
between housework and wages for women while the association for men is
somewhat less negative and not statistically significant. Furthermore, we
find weak support for the effort and selection hypotheses, i.e. the signifi-
cant negative association for women persists even though variables, that are
meant to channel the effect according to theory, are added. In the non-linear
model, we use 18 hours or more of housework as the threshold and find that
men suffer a substantially larger wage penalty than women on this level of
housework. When methods which are meant to reduce endogeneity are ap-
plied, the estimated wage penalty becomes notably larger for both women
and men. This result is obtained from both IV regressions and propensity
score matching. However, we cannot rule out that these estimates are bi-
ased due to issues with the used instrument and limitations to the matching
method.
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Even though the validity of the methods can be questioned, the result that
the effect of housework on wages is negative for essentially all levels of house-
work for women while it requires a high level of housework for men before
the significant negative effect starts, provide insights to the housework-wage
relation in Sweden. The effect of time spent on housework on wages has not
been thoroughly investigated within the economic literature using Swedish
data before, and hence this thesis contributes by discussing the wage penalty
of housework in a Swedish context. The contribution also lies within the
methods used in this thesis, where we extend previous research by attempt-
ing to reduce the endogeneity problem.
The thesis proceeds as follows, first we present a theoretical discussion on the
housework-wage relation. The next section presents and discusses previous
literature on the subject and is followed by a section describing and dis-
cussing the cross-sectional survey data used. The subsequent section is the
methodology section which presents and discusses the three methods used
in this study, which is followed by the results section and finally a section
devoted to summary and concluding remarks.
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Theoretical discussion
In this section we offer a theoretical discussion on the relation between house-
work and wages. Theoretically, the decision to engage in home production,
like housework, is in itself related to other joint decisions that are affected by
both productivity in the labour market and productivity at home. Therefore,
at any given time housework, work effort and the wage rate are potentially
jointly determined (conditional on factors such as marital status and the
number of children). Earlier theoretical models (see for example Gronau
1977) focused mostly on the home production choices of individuals, based
on an exogenous wage rate and home production technology. Particularly in
these models the female wage affects the full (shadow) price of goods from
home production, and thereby it affects home production choices. On the
other hand, other models of female wage determination focus on the im-
portance of time spent on market work, with work experience in particular
focus, or market work interruptions (Mincer 1974) and job characteristics
(e.g. work flexibility). In later developments, the framework was extended
to involve decisions where home production, effort requirements and the wage
rate are to be jointly determined (Becker 1985; Gronau 1988).
To date, theory offers two main possible explanations for how housework
may reduce wages that both originate from Becker (1985). First, housework
could affect wages by affecting the type of work chosen by individuals. More
specifically, housework may influence the choice individuals make about work
characteristics and thereby wage is affected via work related compensating
wage differentials. That is, individuals who spend more time on housework,
predominantly during the working week, may seek out jobs that offer more
flexible work arrangements, such as greater flexibility in scheduling. These
more flexible working arrangements are likely to be costly for firms and so
wages may be lower in such jobs to compensate employers (Hersch 1991a;
Maani and Cruickshank 2010). The possible selection effect of housework is,
in this thesis, denoted the selection hypothesis.
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Second, housework may have a direct effect on wages by affecting the alloca-
tion of effort at home and at work. This direct link suggests that individuals
with the same observable characteristics (such as education, experience, and
occupation) but with different housework responsibilities will earn different
wages. Becker’s (1985) theory of the allocation of effort postulates that in-
dividuals have a limited amount of effort available, and that effort used on
housework undoubtedly reduces the amount of effort left for market work.
Further, the reduced amount of effort left for market work would lower in-
dividual labour productivity and thus the wage. Hence, if work effort, pro-
ductivity and wages are positively correlated, the wages of workers bearing
greater housework responsibilities will be lower than the wages of their less-
burdened peers, a difference that is expected to persist even after controlling
for relevant observable characteristics. The effort reducing effect of house-
work is, in this thesis, denoted the effort hypothesis.
Both hypotheses on the wage effect of housework can be studied in the con-
text of gender differences and the gender wage gap, a connection that was
made by Becker (1985, 1991). The gender wage gap can be explained by
women spending more time on housework and childcare than men in the two-
or-more-persons household. As previously noted, the effort put on household
work leaves less effort available for market work which lowers productivity
and thus reduce wages (i.e. the effort hypothesis). In other words, if men
and women allocate their effort differently between market and non-market
work this would lead to a gender wage gap even though men and women
have accumulated the same human capital over time. Moreover, women
economise on the situation by seeking jobs that demand less effort and thus
occupational differences enhance the wage gap (i.e the selection hypothesis).
The initial specialisation, women on housework and men on market work,
is a difficult pattern to break according to this theory because as partners
become specialised they also become better at doing the tasks and thus gain
as a household on the division of labour (we call this the specialisation hy-
pothesis).4
4 Note that an analysis of the specialisation hypothesis lies outside the scope of this thesis.
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Literature review
There is a growing literature within both economics and sociology about
the relationship between housework and wages. In general, the difference
between the two disciplines is the casual direction between housework and
wages which is partly based on existing theories within economics and sociol-
ogy. The remainder of this section is structured as follows, first an overview of
studies conducted within the economic literature is presented (studies cover-
ing the housework-wage relation, the timing of housework and methodological
challenges in previous studies). For a more comprehensive literature review,
see for example Maani and Cruickshank (2010). Second, an overview of rele-
vant studies conducted within the sociology literature and studies related to
the reversed relationship is presented, including previous studies conducted
using Swedish data.
The housework-wage relation
Several studies build on the work of Becker (1985). The two most prominent
authors who have studied the topic in an American context are Hersch and
Stratton. Two early studies conducted by Hersch (1991a, 1991b) shows that
time spent on household work has a negative impact on women’s wages but
no significant effect on men’s wages. Hersch (1991a, 1991b) discusses, al-
though does not prove, reasons for why these results are in line with Becker’s
(1985) arguments. More specifically, that women suffer from a housework
wage penalty because of reduced amount of effort available for market work
and that women choose jobs which are more easily combined with household
work. Hersch (1991b) refers to this situation as the ’mommy track’. The
’mommy track’ suggests that family responsibilities and careers are funda-
mentally incompatible. Thus, women who have demonstrated that they are
taking on household tasks may in fact place themselves on a slower track
with respect to promotions. Therefore lower wages accompanying greater
household responsibilities could be caused by women being promoted at dif-
ferent rates than men with otherwise similar human capital characteristics.
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Later studies have tried to, more thoroughly, control for different working
conditions in order to investigate the selection hypothesis. Hersch (2009)
controls for occupational types in the housework-wage equation but do not
find that differences in the choice of occupation explain the observed nega-
tive effect of housework on wages. Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) study the
same mechanism using UK data. They investigate the selection hypothesis
of compensating differentials by controlling for occupation in terms of UK
standard occupational classification (on one digit level) and find no support
for that variation in occupation channels the negative housework effect.
Investigations of the effort hypothesis, which is not channeled through spe-
cific job differentials, are more rarely found in the literature, supposedly
because of difficulties to find an appropriate measurement of effort. Nev-
ertheless, Stratton (2001) focuses on a version of the effort hypothesis and
tries to account for work effort (and job flexibility) in the housework-wage
equations. The effort variable is constructed as self-reported job effort di-
vided by self-reported effort watching TV (both on an 11-point scale). This
relative job effort measurement is constructed in attempt to normalise job
effort and thus make it more comparable between individuals. The inclusion
of the innovative effort variable (or job flexibility) does however not change
the estimated wage penalty from housework for women.
In a series of papers Hersch and Stratton (1994, 1997, 2000 and 2002) further
provide key insights into the housework-wage relation. Hersch and Stratton
(1994) partly focus on the allocation of housework within households and
find that wives do more housework than their husbands, in part because
they earn less on average than their husbands. The authors argue that an-
ticipation of greater household responsibilities for women over their lifetime
leads to different investment decisions or outcomes than for men of equal
market ability. Consequently women earn less than men on average because
they invest less in the human capital necessary to increase earnings. The
authors find that even after controlling for gender differences in human cap-
ital and other wage-related characteristics, the time spent on housework is
found to have a direct negative effect on earnings, an effect which is most
prominent for women.
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Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig (2012) are interested in a similar argument, they exam-
ine whether household tasks prohibit women from unfolding their full earning
potential because of reduced work effort and limited time flexibility. They in-
vestigate whether differences in housework can explain the wage gap between
mothers and non-mothers in West Germany. The authors use fixed effects
models and self-reported information on time use and earnings as well as
monthly family and work histories from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(1985–2007). Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig (2012) find that the domestic workload is
a central contributing factor for mothers’ wage disadvantages compared to
non-mothers. A result worth to note is that the mothers in their sample did
not earn less than equally skilled non-mothers if both held the same jobs and
performed only a moderate amount of household tasks.
In Hersch and Stratton (1997) the authors expand the methodology used
in their previous work (ordinary least squares (OLS)) to now include, in-
strumental variables (IV), and fixed effects wage equations to estimate the
housework-wage relation. The cross-sectional estimates, OLS and IV show a
robust negative relation between wages and housework for wives. The fixed
effects estimates reduce, but do not eliminate the negative relation. For
husbands the authors find a more vague relation, OLS estimates suggest a
negative relation between housework and wages, but the effect is statistically
insignificant in the IV and fixed effects specifications. However, the results
found in Hersch and Stratton (1997) provide evidence, that for wives, not
only does housework have a negative effect on earnings but this is neither
due solely to unobserved characteristics nor due to observable human capital
measures. Given the substantial differences in housework time by gender,
the contribution of time spent on housework in explaining the gender wage
gap is, in the words of Hersch and Stratton (1997), considerable.
Hersch and Stratton (2000, 2002) focus on the specialisation hypothesis which
originates from Becker (1985). This hypothesis is closely related to the ob-
served marriage premium for men which is often credited to either the se-
lection of more productive men into marriage or to enhanced productivity
resulting from the specialisation possible within the household. In the sam-
ple examined by the authors, marriage does seem to have made men more
productive in the market. But, this enhanced productivity does not seem
to have resulted from household specialisation. A similar conclusion is pre-
sented by Lincoln (2008) who finds strong evidence for the gendered division
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of labour, but little support for the wage effects predicted by the specialisa-
tion hypothesis.
Hersch and Stratton (2002) show that the difference by marital status in
the total amount of time men spent on home production is small, although
there are differences in the type of housework activities (whether they are
traditionally ’male’, ’female’ or neutral activities). The married men spent
less time than unmarried men on tasks such as cooking and cleaning (tra-
ditionally ’female tasks’).5 With little difference in the total time spent on
housework, Hersch and Stratton (2000) argue that the only way specialisa-
tion can explain the marriage premium is if different types of housework have
different effects on wages. Hersch and Stratton (2002) argues that tradition-
ally ’female tasks’ which generally must be attended to on a daily or almost
daily basis, are more likely to interfere with the work performance and thus
have a greater negative impact on wages.
The timing and thresholds of housework
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the timing of household tasks may
have a substantial impact on the housework wage penalty. This idea have
been discussed in Hersch (1991a) and Stratton (2001) in relation to differ-
ences between which household tasks women and men perform. For men, it
might be that the negative effects of housework on earnings may start at a
point beyond the number of hours typically spent on housework. Further-
more, the timing of housework done by men and women may be different.
For example, women may be more involved than their husbands in getting
children ready for school, or may be more likely than men to hurry home from
work because of child care needs or meal preparation, whereas men may en-
gage in their share of household responsibilities after work and on weekends.
Any reduction of effort available for market work caused by housework should
be more pronounced if housework is timed closely with market work.
5 In Hersch and Stratton (2000) traditionally ’male’ tasks are maintenance and repair
while neutral tasks are paying bills and chauffeuring children.
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The timing aspect of housework is closely related to potential threshold ef-
fects of housework, i.e. small amounts of housework may fit into any schedule,
but substantial amount of housework may disrupt market work performance.
Threshold effects can be examined by changing the housework-wage equa-
tion to allow for non-linear effects. Hersch and Stratton (1997) investigates
potential threshold effects by stratifying the housework variable into three
intervals. They find that the significant wage penalty from housework starts
at 10 hours per week for women, while for men the wage penalty is similar
across the intervals. Hersch (2009) examines the housework threshold of one
hour per week and concludes that the significant negative impact of house-
work on wages does indeed require at least one hour of housework in order
to kick in.
Bonke et al (2005) have extended the analysis of housework and wages in
the context of timing of housework and flexibility of market work. They use
quantile regressions on Danish data from 1987-1991 and find that housework
has a negative impact on female wages and a positive impact on male wages.
However, the effect is reversed for persons in the upper part of the conditional
wage distribution, primarily high-wage men receive the largest negative ef-
fect of housework on wages. Moreover, the authors find that flexibility and
timing of housework affect wages more than the amount of time spent on
housework. Females (and to some extent males) who have inflexible work-
ing conditions and whose household tasks require larger blocks of continuous
time have lower wages. Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) also investigates the
flexibility aspect and find no evidence of that these circumstances impact
the effect of housework on wages. In general they find that housework has a
negative impact on both the wage of men and women (married and single,
full-time workers).
Keith and Malone (2005) considers the timing of housework over the life-
cycle using a sample of young, middle-aged, and older married workers from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1983–93 waves). Keith and Malone
(2005) find using OLS, fixed effects, and panel data instrumental variables
that young and middle-aged wives are the only groups for which there are
consistent evidence of a housework effect on wages. The authors find that
each additional hour of housework reduces the wages of young and middle-
aged wives by 0.1–0.4 %. Additionally, the authors find evidence that for
young workers, housework time is an important determinant of the wage gap
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between men and women.
In summary, there is a reason to believe that household tasks which are per-
formed on a daily basis (typical ’female tasks’) interfere with market work
and thus have a tendency to lower wages. Moreover, the relationship be-
tween housework and wages is not necessarily linear since some amount of
housework is compatible with most working schedules.
Methodological challenges in previous studies
In the literature about housework and wages, the potential endogeneity of
housework is a substantial methodological challenge for estimating the causal
effect of housework on wages. The potential endogeneity problem is briefly
mentioned here and more thoroughly discussed in the methodology section.
Problems with endogeneity can arise because of omitted variables, simulta-
neous causality and measurement errors. First, there could be unobserved
characteristics that affect both time spent on housework and wages, such
as individual ability. Second, it is clear that there is possible simultaneous
causality between housework and wages. Housework is assumed to have an
effect on wages but at the same time wages likely effect time spent on house-
work as well. Thirdly, the housework variable is commonly obtained from
surveys as self-assessed time spent on housework and thus there can be mea-
surement errors, for a discussion on measurement errors see the data section.
Previous studies have tried to address the endogeneity of housework by ap-
plying methods that fully or partially solve the problem. The two main
methods used are fixed effects (FE) models and instrumental variable (IV)
regression. The fixed effects model can be applied when panel data is avail-
able, for example data on individuals over time. The idea is to use the panel
to control for unobserved heterogeneity which is constant for individuals over
time and thus reduce the omitted variable bias.
Nevertheless, the FE approach does not deal with the problem of reverse
causality. Instrumental variable regressions with valid instruments account
for the entire endogeneity issue. The problem is that it is very difficult to
find valid instruments. The requirements for a valid instrument are that the
instrument is correlated with the endogenous independent variable of interest
(the first stage exists) and that the instrument is uncorrelated with any other
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determinants of the dependent variable (exclusion restriction). The latter re-
quirement is an identifying assumption which is solely based on motivation
which in many cases can be questioned. For example Bonke et al (2005)
acknowledge the possibility of endogeniety of household work variables and
try to address the problem using instrumental variable regression, but do not
succeed in finding valid instruments.
Many studies that have applied either FE and/or IV have concluded that
housework is in fact exogenous by the means of Hausman tests. Among
these are Hersch and Stratton (1997) who use the instruments non-labour
income, spousal characteristics and earnings, information on the number and
ages of children in the household and information on the size, type, and own-
ership status of the residence. Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) use IV FE, as
a robustness check, with the spouse’s labour participation, hourly wage and
work hours, and number of employed household members as instruments.
The identifying assumption is that the working circumstances of the partner
affect the other partner’s time spent on housework but is unrelated to any
shock to that partner’s wage. They find that the instruments are only valid
for married men. They use a Hausman test of IV FE against FE and finds
that housework is exogenous in the FE specification, thus the authors see
no need for IV. According to us, it is bold to draw this conclusion based on
invalid instruments (except for married men).
In contrast to the many studies based on OLS (e.g. Hersch and Stratton
1994), studies that have attempted to account for the endogeneity of house-
work have found no evidence of a housework wage effect. McLennan (2000)
investigates the wage penalty of housework for women based on US data from
1980s. The effect is examined by applying OLS but is complemented with
an IV approach which is meant to eliminate the endogeneity of housework.
The instruments are non-labour household income, a dummy for whether the
ideal number of children exceeds two (asked in 1971), spouse’s education, the
average number of housework and market hours reported by the respondent’s
sister. The results from the OLS regression show a significant negative effect
of housework on wages for white married women. When corrections for en-
dogeniety are made, there is no housework effect on wages for any subgroup.
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Similar results are obtained by Hirsh and Koneitzko (2013) who examine
the impact of housework on wages with data from Germany. They use two
different datasets, a survey panel from 2000-2009 and a time diary data from
2001/2002. They apply a fixed effects model on the panel and OLS regres-
sion on the cross-sectional dataset. In contrast to many earlier studies, the
authors find no significant negative effect of housework on wages (for any
subgroup). Housework is instrumented in the OLS regressions to deal with
potential endogeneity. This robustness check confirms the initial results. The
instruments used follow previous studies (Hersch and Startton 1997, Bryan
and Sevilla-Sanz 2011) and include a dummy for house/flat, a dummy for
ownership of the residence and the size of the residence. The authors ac-
knowledge that some endogeneity may still prevail using these instruments
since for example a positive wage shock may be followed by moving to a
larger house.
Deloach and Hoffman (2002) investigates women’s allocation of time spent on
housework and the effect on wages in Russia 1994-1996. The authors use IV
regressions where household work is instrumented by family income, number
of children under five, number of adult women in the household, number of
adult men in the household, ownership of washing machine and automobile.
They find no evidence of an effect of housework on wages for women.
The fact that many studies which attempt to account for endogeneity of
housework find no evidence of a wage penalty must be viewed with some
caution. The reason for this is that the instruments used in previous lit-
erature can be questioned with regard to failure of fulfilling the exclusion
restriction. The exogeneity of housework is most certainly uncertain and we
provide a more thorough discussion of problems regarding instruments used
in previous studies in the methodological description of IV (see Methodology
- IV regression).
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Sociology and the reverse relationship
The relation between housework and wages, has as mentioned also been in-
vestigated within sociology, where there are three main theories that have
been examined (resource-bargaining, gender display and the absolute earn-
ings theories). Two of these theories (resource-bargaining and gender display)
have been developed as a critique against the ‘functionalist’ model (Becker
1991, Lopata 1993) in which the common goal of household members is to
maximise household utility, and in doing so the woman and man specialises
on different tasks, men work because they have higher wages and women do
housework since they are better at it (Gupta 2007). A feminist critique of
the ’functionalist’ model focuses on the household not being a common force
but rather a unit of conflicting interest where women have less bargaining
power because of their lower wages (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; England
and Budig 1998). Originating from this idea, the first theory is the resource-
bargaining perspective which builds on the notion that women’s housework
is affected by the economic dependence of women on men.6 Specifically,
there is an imbalance in bargaining power within couples, the person with
the highest income and human capital have a superior position to negotiate
away housework.
The second theory, gender display, is that women who earn more than what
is normatively expected also do more housework to compensate for their nor-
mative deviation. This theory is based on the concept that doing tasks that
are associated with ones gender, creates the gender. So, high earning women
may do more traditionally female housework in order to enhance their gender
identification (Gupta 2007; Evertsson and Nermo 2004). Both of these the-
ories are about how women’s relative earnings (to their partners) affect the
housework. Gupta (2007) specifies the third theory, the absolute earnings
theory, which is that women’s time spent on housework is affected by their
own wage, independent of the partner’s wage. Gupta and Ash (2008) extend
the analyses made by Gupta (2007), they show that a person’s own earnings
affect own housework, especially for women.
6 The bargaining theory is not exclusively investigated within sociology, there exists an
extensive literature regarding bargaining within economics as well.
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The gender display theory is examined by The´baud (2010), who uses the
International Social Survey Program with data on 18 countries to investi-
gate cross-national differences in what effect men’s income relative to their
spouse’s income has on men’s involvement in housework. The hypothesis is
that gender expectations will be more prominent in men’s household bargain-
ing in contexts where the traditionally masculine and breadwinning-related
activities of paid work are highly valued. The´baud (2010) employs a hierar-
chical linear model (HLM) and finds that gendered expectations play a larger
role in men’s contributions to housework in countries where cultural norms
strongly endorse paid work and earning a high income. The results provide
support for the gender display theory, that individuals are persistently held
accountable for their gender in interactions, if not by themselves, then by oth-
ers. The´baud (2010) concludes that the prevalent gender expectation of male
breadwinners provides a way of understanding how gender expectations play
themselves out in implicit spousal exchanges between housework and income.
Although the reverse relationship is predominantly studied within sociology,
it has also been investigated within economics by Bloemen and Stancanelli
(2014) who analyse how wages affect the allocation of time including time
spent on housework. An interesting feature of this study is that the authors
take the simultaneity of housework decisions into account so that conclusions
on the effect of partners’ wage on partners’ time allocation can be drawn.
Using a ten simultaneous equations model applied on a French dataset from
1998-99, the authors find that wage rate affects market work hours positively
and housework hours negatively. Moreover, the male partner’s wage rate has
a significantly negative effect on the female partner’s market work hours, also
the female partner’s wage rate has a significantly positive effect on the male
partner’s housework hours. To deal with the endogeneity of wages, Bloemen
and Stancanelli (2014) instrument wage using past and current occupational
types. The exclusion restriction that occupational type do not affect the allo-
cation of time other than through wages is motivated by French working hour
regulations, thus occupation would not determine working hours. According
to us, this may be true in France, but in the case of many other countries
it would not hold since evidently different occupations demand more or less
working hours. Furthermore, some occupations demand inconvenient work-
ing hours (e.g. night shift) which also could have an effect on the amount of
time spent on household work and childcare.
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Swedish studies
The relation between housework and wages has been examined in Sweden,
predominantly within a sociological context. The gendered division of labour
between housework and market work in Sweden have been examined with
the same data used in this thesis by Boye and Evertsson (2014) who show
that women’s time in market work has increased significantly between 1974-
2010 while the time spent on housework has decreased. For men, the time
in market work has been more or less constant during the studied period,
but their time in housework has increased but at a decreasing rate (the in-
crease mainly occurred between 1974-1991). For this reason, even though
the time spent on housework is equally distributed between men and women
in approximately 20 % of the households in 2010, the authors are skeptical
about a large increase of this fraction in the near future. Furthermore, the
authors find no support for the resource-bargaining hypothesis or the abso-
lute earnings hypothesis (Gupta 2007). Instead, their results indicate that
women with high wages have stable preferences of doing less housework (in
a FE analysis).
The same dataset is used in Boye et al (2014) which focus on whether the
gender wage gap in Sweden can be explained by gender differences in time
spent on housework. The general observation is that the gender wage gap in
Sweden has been more or less constant around 12-15 % for the last 20 years
(controlling for experience, seniority, sector and qualification level). The
OLS analysis of the data from 2010 shows that housework does not explain
the gender wage gap, neither for persons with qualified jobs nor for persons
with unqualified jobs. It should however be noted that this analysis does not
take the issue of endogeneity of housework into account and is thus merely
descriptive.
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Evertsson and Nermo (2004) evaluate the relative resource-bargaining per-
spective and the gender display theory in the context of division of housework
in the US and Sweden 1970-2000. The method used is separate OLS regres-
sions for all years, where the dependent variable is hours of housework a week,
the main independent variable of interest is economic dependence (resource-
bargaining perspective) and the square of economic dependence (gender dis-
play approach). Their analyses show that the resource-bargaining theory
receives more support in Sweden, while the gender display theory receives
support in the US.
In summary, the Swedish sociological studies about housework and wages
indicate that there is a gender wage gap in Sweden which is unaffected by
variations in housework. Moreover, there is no support for the gender display
theory. In contrary, women with high wages seem to prefer doing less house-
work. The results from the sociological field provide insights to the reverse
relation between housework and wages which is of importance to this study
in order to understand the potential endogeneity of housework. The effect
of time spent on housework on wages has not been extensively investigated
within the economic literature using Swedish data before, and hence this the-
sis will attempt to fill that void by discussing the wage effect of housework
in a Swedish context. The contribution also lies within the methods used
in this thesis, where we will extend previous research by investigating the
endogeneity problem more thoroughly.
17
Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study is the Swedish level-of-living survey from 2010,
henceforth LNU, which is collected by the Swedish Institute for Social Re-
search (SOFI).7 LNU is one of the longest running longitudinal social science
surveys in the world which was first conducted in 1968 and has since then
been replicated five times. This thesis only uses the survey from 2010, the
most recent one, and is hence a cross-sectional study. Had a panel data set
been used one could have dealt with possible endogeneity problems with fixed
effects methods, instead other methods are applied in this thesis in attempt
to solve endogeneity problems, as described in the methodology section.
It is of importance to note that the data used is survey data, thus measure-
ment errors may occur due to respondents over- or under-reporting their time
spent on housework. Other studies (e.g. Hersch 2009; Hirsch and Konietzko
2013) have used time-diary data to examine housework, where individuals
have reported more or less exactly how much time they spend on different
activities during a day (for some amount of days). Kan (2008) compare
British time-diary and survey data and concludes that there are systematic
errors in survey data, in particular both men and women over-reports time
spent on housework in surveys but men over-reports significantly more than
women. In Nordic countries, similar analyses contradicts Kan’s (2008) find-
ings. Using Danish data, Bonke (2005) finds that both men and women
under-reports time spent on housework in surveys and women under-reports
more than men do but the gender difference is quite small. Using Norwe-
gian data, Kitterød and Lyngstad (2005) also find that respondent in general
under-report time spent on housework in surveys and find no evidence of any
gender differences. Boye (2008) suggests that these conflicting geographical
results can be due to that social desirability to act according to gender norms
is less of a problem in Scandinavian countries. Based on these results, we
believe that the survey data used in this thesis do not suffer from systematic
housework reporting errors due to gender. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility of other systematic errors, for example that young people over-
reports housework while old people under-reports housework (see Kitterød
and Lyngstad 2005). There is, however, no reason to believe that the po-
7 The interested reader can find more information on LNU at
http://www.sofi.su.se/english/research/three-research-departments/lnu-level-of-living
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tential measurement errors will severely impact the results, at least not as
much as the the other potential endogeneity problems which we try to ac-
count for with methods complementary to OLS (and which to some extent
also account for measurement errors).
The random sample in LNU 2010 uses 1/1000 of the Swedish population
between 18 and 75 years of age. The respondents are asked questions about
their living conditions in several areas. The areas of interest for this thesis are
the ones covering the individuals’ time spent on housework, income, educa-
tion, health and similar individual characteristics. Information on how much
time the respondents devote to housework is a sum of answers collected from
the following three questions: ”How many hours per week do you spend on
cleaning?”, ”How many hours per week do you spend on cooking, doing the
dishes and food shopping?” and ”How many hours per week do you spend on
doing the laundry and/or ironing clothes?”. We expect that the accuracy of
the housework variable is improved by the fact that time spent on housework
is based on three separate questions because it is easier for respondents to
assess time spent on specific tasks separately instead of a sole assessment of
housework in general.
The data also contains information on time spent on repairs and mainte-
nance of properties such as the respondent’s house and car. Including this
information would decrease the housework gender gap slightly.8 However,
we choose to omit this information from the housework variable for three
reasons. First, repair and maintenance activities are less likely part of the
every day housework which interferes with market work. This argument is
in line with Hersch and Stratton (2000, 2002) who found that these kind of
household tasks which are ’typically female’ influence wages more than other
types of household tasks because of the characteristics and timing. Second,
this type of housework is heavily influenced by seasons and thus contain
irregularities depending on when during the year the respondents provided
their answers (Boye and Evertsson 2014). Third, adding this information
to the housework variable induces a great loss of number of observations
(approximately 550) due to missing values in the repair and maintenance
information. One further restriction that we impose is not to include time
8 The gap between the average time spent on housework decreases from approximately
4.5 hours to 3 hours, however the difference in mean is still statistically significant.
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spent on childcare (such as picking up children from day care/school). The
inclusion of childcare would lead to an analysis based only on individuals
with young children. The aim of this thesis is to comment on the wage effect
of housework for women and men in general, not just the effect on parents of
young children. Moreover it should also be noted that only 741 individuals
answered the questions regarding childcare.
In order to estimate wage equations we construct a set of standard wage de-
terminants from the variables in LNU 2010. First there is Education which is
defined as the total years of education, next is Experience which is defined as
total years of paid employment. Following, there are five dummy variables:
Children, Cohabiting, Full time, Public sector and Qualified work. These
dummy variables take the value 1 if, respectively, the individual has chil-
dren, is married or cohabitant, was employed full time during 2009, currently
works in the public sector and if the individual’s occupation is qualified work.
The sample used in this thesis is restricted to working individuals of age
18-65 that had reported an hourly before-tax wage (in SEK) in the interval
[50,750]. Furthermore, the sample only includes respondents who do house-
work in the interval [0,40] hours per week to avoid unrealistic answers.9 The
fact that we only use information from individuals who reported a wage can
cause selection bias. That is, persons who do not earn a wage may have
very different characteristics than persons who earn a wage, which leads to
a non-representative sample. Our restricted sample (in terms of age and
housework) contains 344 individuals with missing values of wage (13 % of
the total sample). If the potential wages of these individuals are affected
differently by housework than individuals with an actual wage, our estimates
will be biased. The reasons for the missing values of wage are unknown,
but we do know that 127 out of the 344 individuals are self-employed and
are thus expected to earn an income by different means than a wage. Given
this fact and that the fraction is relatively low, we do not expect that the
exclusion of individuals with missing values on wage severely impact our es-
timates. Although, the conservative reader may want to limit the validity
of the results to the part of the population which earn a traditional wage.
The sample size, after imposing all restrictions, is 1180 men and 1100 women.
9 The wage and housework restriction leads to 10 and 26 omitted observations, respec-
tively. The restrictions do not cause any major differences in the baseline results.
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For descriptive statistics on the variables included, see Table 1. Starting
with the dependent variable it becomes clear from Table 1 that the mean
hourly wage is lower for women than for men, 153.95 SEK compared 180.91
SEK. The difference in mean hourly wage for men and women is statisti-
cally significant at the 1 % level, see Appendix A for t-tests. Table 1 also
displays the variables included in the standard wage equations, such as Ex-
perience and Education. Next is the main variable of interest, Housework.
The difference in mean hours spent on housework between men and women
is quite large (and statistically significant, see Appendix A), 8.10 hours com-
pared to 12.81 hours. The next type of variables are the ones stemming from
Becker’s (1985) effort hypothesis and include variables that are assumed to
affect individuals’ effort. The second channel are variables stemming from
the selection hypothesis and include variables reflecting working conditions
10. Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the instrumental variable,
Equality opinion, where 56.09 % of women and 46.10 % of men strongly sup-
ported the question ”What do you think about the suggestion of committing
to a society where men take the same amount of responsibility for children
and housework as women?”.
10 Descriptive statistics of two digit profession identification is omitted from Table 1 due
to lack of space.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES Females Males
Dependent variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev
Wage 153.9493 50.0836 180.9051 73.4482
Standard wage determinants
Cohabiting 0.7309 0 .4437 0.7085 0.4547
Education 14.0227 3.1340 13.5898 2.9410
Experience 21.0364 12.3416 21.3576 13.1788
City 0.3636 0 .4813 0.3200 0.4668
Full time 0.9782 0.1462 0.9703 0.1697
Public sector 0.5573 0.4969 0.2534 0.4351
Children 0.5236 0.4997 0.4703 0.4993
Qualified work 0.4809 0.4999 0.4559 0.4983
Explanatory variable of interest
Housework 12.8109 6.5419 8.1072 4.7970
Housework dummy 0.1964 0.3974 0.0466 0.2109
Health channel - effort hypothesis
Fatigue 0.2718 0.4451 0.1602 0.3669
Stomach 0.2073 0.4055 0.1288 0.3351
Headache 0.5182 0.4999 0.3805 0.4857
Sleep 0.2191 0.4138 0.1305 0.3370
Overwork 0.0718 0.2583 0.0407 0.1976
Working conditions channel -
selection hypothesis
High flexibility? 0.3178 0.4660 0.4483 0.4976
Heavy lift 0.0791 0.2700 0.1915 0.3937
Physically demanding 0.4427 0.4969 0.4051 0.4911
Mentally demanding 0.6364 0.4813 0.5711 0.4951
Stressful work 0.7673 0.4228 0.7322 0.4430
Monotonous work 0.1746 0.3798 0.1966 0.3976
Mental work 0.3036 0.4600 0.2271 0.4192
Emotionally demanding 0.2273 0.4193 0.0525 0.2232
Instrument
Equality opinion 0.5609 0.4965 0.4610 0.4987
Sample size 1100 1180
?number of observations: 664 for women and 774 for men.
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Methodology
The greatest methodological challenge of estimating the causal effect of house-
work on wages is the potential endogeneity of housework. Three reasons are
often used to describe why a variable is endogenous in the standard OLS
regression: omitted variables, simultaneous causality and measurement er-
rors. In fact, all of these are potential problems when estimating the effect
of housework on wages. First, most often there are unobserved character-
istics that affect both time spent on housework and wages. This could for
example be individual ability such that low ability workers may have both
low wages and spend more time on housework. Failure of controlling for
ability will thus cause a downward bias of the effect of housework (it will
enhance the presumed negative effect). Second, it is evident that there can
be simultaneous causality between housework and wages. Housework is pre-
sumed to have an effect on wages (the direction of causality examined in this
study) but at the same time wages likely affect time spent on housework as
well (the direction of causality examined in most sociological studies on the
topic). Consider workers with a high market wage, for these individuals the
opportunity cost for spending time on housework is high, and as Hersch and
Stratton (1997) argue these workers may be more likely to substitute market
solutions for housework which will reduce their time spent on housework. If
this is the case, then the housework time that we observe could be correlated
with the error term, and the OLS estimate will be downward biased (Hirsh
and Koneitzko 2013). That is, housework will appear to have a greater neg-
ative effect on wages than it actually has. Thirdly, the housework variable
is most often obtained through surveys as self-assessed time spent on house-
work and can thus be inflicted by measurement errors. This is of less concern
in this study as discussed in relation to the data type in the data section.
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In order to shed light on the relationship between housework and wages in
Sweden, we apply three different methods. In this section, the application of
the methods are described and discussed. The basic approach is to use OLS
as a foundation for the analysis and use two other methods which partly deal
with the endogeneity of housework as a complementary analysis. Following
previous studies (e.g. Hersch and Stratton 2002; Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz
2011; Hirsh and Koneitzko 2013) the main analysis throughout this thesis is
conducted for females and men separately.
OLS regression
In earlier studies about housework and wages the most commonly used
method is ordinary least squares (OLS). The advantage of using OLS is that
the method provides an intuitive way of examining potential channels of the
housework wage penalty. The disadvantage is, as previously mentioned, that
housework may be endogenous and thus the estimated effect in the OLS re-
gression will be biased. In applying OLS, we estimate the following wage
equation in a similar vein as Hersch (1991a) and Hersch and Stratton (1997):
W = β′1X + β
′
2H + ε (1)
Where W is the logarithm of before-tax hourly wage, X is a vector of mea-
surable characteristics assumed to affect wages. The standard wage determi-
nants in X, in what we call the baseline regression, are Education, Experience
and its square, City, Full time, Public sector, Children and Qualified work
(see Appendix B for a comprehensive description of the variables). H is hours
per week spent on housework and ε is the error term. Becker’s (1985) theory
postulates that housework has a negative effect on wages and accordingly β2
is expected to be negative.
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As mentioned before, there are two main channels through which housework
may effect the wage; by reducing the amount of effort left for market work
and by influencing the type of work chosen. We start by investigating these
two channels with OLS. Our first specification covers the selection hypothesis
investigated through the working conditions channel, where the argument is
that individuals who take on greater household responsibilities may seek jobs
that are easier to combine with a higher share of housework. For example
jobs with a high degree of flexibility may be associated with a wage penalty
since they are costly for employers. Thus, we add variables to the baseline
regression which reflect working conditions (for a complete list and descrip-
tion of variables included see Appendix B) which are expected to reduce the
negative effect of housework on wages. The second specification will cover
the effort hypothesis, where the line of reasoning is that individuals that take
on greater household responsibilities will have less effort left for market work
which in turn reduces their labour productivity and thus their wage. Where
the reduced effort would manifest itself as a worsening of individuals’ health
in stress related areas such as fatigue, headaches and a sense of overwork.
Therefore, in the second specification we add variables to the baseline regres-
sion which measures individual health, concerning symptoms of stress, which
are expected to reduce the negative effect of housework on wages. Both of
these channels offer explanations to why the gender wage gap persists. That
is, since women perform a greater share of housework their wages will be re-
duced either because of working conditions or because of a reduction of effort.
Further, OLS is used in order to estimate a non-linear specification of the
housework-wage equation. Initially, the housework variable is broken down
into 20 dummy variables, each representing a 2 hours interval in the span
[0,40]. The following model is then estimated:
W = α′1X + α
′
2H
2−4 + · · ·+ α′20H38−40 + ε (2)
Where W and X are defined in the same way as in equation (1) but the effect
of housework is estimated for each level of housework in comparison to the
0-2 hours category.
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Based on the results from equation (2)11, the main non-linear specification
is defined as follows:
W = γ′1X + γ
′
2H
18−40 + ε (3)
Equation (3) is identical to equation (2), except that it only includes one
dummy variable, H18−40, which captures the effect of doing 18 hours or more
housework per week in comparison to doing less than 18 hours of housework
per week. That is, it captures the threshold of 18 hours per week which we
are interested in.
IV regression
As initially described, if the time spent on housework is correlated with the
error term then the estimates from OLS will be biased. In attempt to correct
for the endogeneity problem we will use instrumental variable (IV) regres-
sions. In IV regressions, the endogenous explanatory variable of interest is
instrumented by a variable which fulfills two requirements, it should be corre-
lated with the explanatory variable of interest (the existence of a first stage)
and uncorrelated with the dependent variable and any other determinants of
the dependent variable (the exclusion restriction). By using IV regression,
only the part of the variation in the explanatory variable of interest which is
not endogenous is utilised.
In order to perform the IV regressions one needs a valid instrument which
fulfills the two requirements. To find a valid instrument is, to say the least,
challenging. It is usually the exclusion restriction, which is an identifying
assumption, that is most difficult to motivate. A number of instruments
used in previous studies where considered, such as house characteristics (e.g.
number of rooms) and partner characteristics (e.g. the partner’s wage, work
time and education). The house characteristics where ruled out as instru-
ment because the exclusion restriction cannot be properly motivated, it is
evident that for example the size of ones house is related to ones wage in
other ways than through the time spent on housework. A similar argument
can be made for partner characteristics, for example highly educated persons
11 See Figure 1 in the Results section.
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often couple with other highly educated persons thus the partner’s education
affects the other partner’s wage through other channels than time spent on
housework. Other instruments considered, not used in any other studies of
our knowledge, where sibling position, age when moving away from home and
years of cohabiting in current relationship. These instruments where ruled
out primarily due to re-markedly weak correlation with housework12 but also
due to insufficient motivation of the exclusion restriction.
In this study we introduce the instrument Equality opinion, not used in any
other study of our knowledge. The instrument is based on individuals’ at-
titudes towards gender equality within the family and is formed from the
question in LNU: ”What do you think about the suggestion of committing to
a society where men take the same amount of responsibility for children and
housework as women?”. The variable Equality opinion is constructed as a
dummy variable where the individuals who have answered that the sugges-
tion is very good are given the value 1, while the rest are given the value 0.13
The existence of a first stage is not difficult to motivate, if individuals agree
with the statement, then the instrument should be correlated with the time
they spend on housework.
Regarding the exclusion restriction, we argue that one’s opinion about equal-
ity within the family should not effect wage through any other channels than
housework. This is because the question relates to what kind of society one
wants to live in (it is to large degree a hypothetical question) and the opin-
ion of the ideal society in terms of gender equality is not necessarily related
to ones wage or unobserved characteristics. For example, persons with high
wages may spend few hours doing housework because it is compatible with
their family organisation, however this does not mean that they in fact think
that their family organisation is ideal. This line of argument does not ex-
clude the existence of a first stage since a positive opinion may still increase
or decrease the time spent on housework to some extent. Similarly, persons
with an unrevealed preference for spending time on housework, may still have
12 The first-stage F-values for these other instruments where for sibling position F= 1.32
for women and F= 0.46 for men, for age when moving away from home F= 3.17 for
women and F= 1.85 for men, and for years of cohabiting in current relationship F= 4.88
for women and F= 23.96 for men.
13 The remaining available evaluations of the suggestion are ’Pretty good’, ’Neither good
or bad’, ’Pretty bad’, ’Very bad’ and ’Do not know’.
27
a different idea of gender equality within families in general. Thus an impor-
tant aspect of the instrument is that the underlying question does not refer
to ones own family but families in general. Nevertheless, we do acknowledge
the possibility that Equality opinion can be affected by persons’ unrevealed
preferences and characteristics and thus the endogeneity of housework will
prevail. It may also be that the amount of housework a person does de-
termines how the person answers the question, for example a woman who
does the majority of housework in a household may chose to disapprove the
suggestion in order to justify her own living circumstances.
In order to understand potential biases in the IV estimate of housework with
the chosen instrument, we take a look at the instrumental variable regression
procedure. Equation (4) is a simplified version of the OLS equation (1)
where W is (hourly) wage and H is Housework, which here is endogenous
so that H and the error term ε are correlated. Equation (5) shows the first
stage (simplified without baseline covariates) where the dependent variable
is Housework, Z is the instrument Equality opinion and η is the error term.
With a valid instrument, one can obtain Ĥ from equation (5) by OLS and
use this estimate in equation (4) and thus only use the part of housework
which is exogenous.
W = β′H + ε (4)
H = γ′Z + η (5)
When we only have one instrument and one endogenous explanatory variable
of interest, the IV estimate can be written as β̂IV = (Z
′H)−1Z ′W or β̂IV =
β+ Z
′ε
Z′H . Taking the probability limit of β̂IV yields equation (6) which shows
that the IV estimate is only unbiased if Z is uncorrelated with ε.
plim β̂IV = β +
σZ,ε
σZ,H
(6)
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The bias term in equation (6) captures the impact of both the exclusion re-
striction σZ,ε = 0 and the existence of a first stage σZ,H 6= 0. We can use this
expression to form expectations about a potential bias of the IV estimate. As
previously mentioned, one of the greatest disadvantage with Equality opinion
is that people might answer the question in a certain way in order to jus-
tify their own housework behaviour, thus housework affects equality opinion
rather than the other way around. If wage determines housework, then it
will determine equality opinion as well which will cause correlation between
the instrument and the error term. To investigate what may happen in this
situation, we assume that women who do much housework have some char-
acteristic which we call low ability14 that causes low wages and these women
justify their housework by having a negative equality opinion.
Similarly, men who do much housework have low ability that causes low
wages and these men justify their housework by having a positive equality
opinion. According to these assumptions, for women, the negative effect of
housework on wages is really due to that negative equality opinion is associ-
ated with low ability. Similarly for men, the negative effect of housework on
wages may in fact be due to that positive equality opinion is associated with
low ability. These situations will lead to a downward bias since for women
the instrument is positively correlated with ε and σZ,H is negative while it is
reversed for men, σZ,ε is negative and σZ,H is positive.
15 The magnitude of
the bias is enhanced if the denominator in the bias term of equation (6) is
close to zero, i.e. if the correlation between the instrument and explanatory
variable of interest is weak.
In summary, the main problems with using Equality opinion as an instrument
for housework is that neither can we guarantee that persons with a positive
equality opinion is completely similar to persons with a negative equality
opinion other than when it comes to housework, nor that persons answer the
question independently of how much housework they actually do. An ideal
instrument would be something that completely randomly affected time spent
on housework. The ideal situation would be an experiment where a randomly
selected fraction would receive a household appliance which greatly reduced
14 Ability is just a phrase used to describe unknown characteristics and preferences which
affects wages positively and housework negatively.
15 See Table 5 for first stage equations.
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time spent on housework. To find such situations, where people do not make
an active choice but rather are forced or offered an advantageous opportunity
for treatment, is very difficult. In this thesis we have decided to use Equality
opinion as an instrument for housework despite the risk of biased estimates.
The nature of the instrument will thus not allow for casual interpretation
but, at the very least, it will highlight the issues involved in accounting for
the endogeneity of housework in the housework-wage equation.
Propensity score matching
The above empirical OLS specification is extended with the addition of house-
work as a dummy variable in order to shed light on potential threshold effects
of housework as examined in previous literature (Hersch and Stratton 1997;
Hersch 2009). That is, the significant negative effect of housework on wages
may start after a certain amount of time spent on housework, as mentioned
we use the threshold level 18 hours or more of housework. In order to deal
with endogeneity in this framework, propensity score matching is applied.
Matching is a technique used to estimate the effect of a treatment by ac-
counting for the covariates that predict treatment. That is, what matching
tries to do is to mimic randomisation by creating a sample of individuals that
received treatment that is comparable on all covariates to those individuals
that did not receive treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
The matching is done using the propensity to be treated, i.e. the probabil-
ity of conducting more than the threshold hours of housework per week (the
treatment) should be more or less equal for controls and treated. The propen-
sity scores are calculated using a probit model where the covariates are the
standard control variables from the baseline regression. The procedure that
follows is that the sample is divided into blocks so that the mean propensity
scores for treated and untreated are similar within every block. The blocks
enable analysis of the balancing property, i.e. t-tests are performed for the
covariates within each block to ensure that the treatment and control group
are similar in terms of covariates.
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Once the treatment and control group are established, each treated individual
is matched with a very similar untreated individual and the average treatment
effect of the treated (ATT) is obtained by taking the average of the difference
in the logarithm of wage between treated and controls as follows:
ATT =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(W treatedi −W controli ) (7)
The matching of individuals can be performed in various ways, in this study
we apply nearest-neighbour matching, radius matching and Kernel match-
ing. The nearest-neighbour approach matches each treated individual with
the control which has the closest propensity score. This method is intuitively
straight forward but it can lead to ’bad’ matches since the nearest-neighbour
for some treated individuals may not be very ’near’. Using radius matching,
one can define what is sufficiently near in terms of propensity score. In this
study, the radius sizes tested are 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001. The Kernel approach
matches each treated individual with a weighted average of all controls, where
near controls are given larger weights. All matching methods are applied with
replacement, i.e. the same control can be matched with several treated ob-
servations, to avoid bad matches and sample shrinkage. Furthermore, the
standard errors of the ATT estimates are estimated using bootstrap with
200 replications.
The advantage of using propensity score matching is that it balances treat-
ment and control group, on a large group of covariates, without losing a
large number of observations. By comparing two very similar groups, it is
possible to obtain a less biased treatment effect than in the case of OLS.
One disadvantage of propensity score matching is that it only accounts for
observed (and observable) covariates. Unobserved factors that could affect
who is and who is not treated, and thereby could affect the outcome, can-
not be accounted for in the matching procedure. As the procedure only
controls for observed variables, any hidden bias due to latent variables may
remain after matching. One other problem is that propensity score matching
requires large samples, with substantial overlap between treatment and con-
trol groups. To our knowledge the use of matching has not been employed
in previous studies of the housework-wage relation.
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Results
OLS results
In this section the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
are presented. The baseline results are reported in Table 2. First the simplest
regression possible is presented, where Wage is regressed on Housework (see
column 1 and 3 of Table 2), and the results shows that Housework has the
expected negative association with wages for both men and women, however
only statistically significant for women. Next in the baseline regression which
includes standard controls (see column 2 and 4 in Table 2), the housework
coefficient remains negative and only significant for women, where housework
reduce women’s wages with 0.22 %.16 Turning the attention to the control
variables, the variables Education, Experience and its square, City, Full time,
Public sector and Qualified work are all significant and have their expected
sign. It is worth noting that Cohabiting has a positive and significant effect
on men’s and women’s wages, thus it seems that a marriage/cohabitation pre-
mium is present. The marriage premium is a debatable wage effect, where
previous studies have found mixed results, as an example consider Lincoln
(2008) who finds no support for the marriage premium. The same line of
reasoning can be applied to the positive and significant effect of Children
found in Table 2 (see for example Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz 2011).
16 The difference in the housework effect on wages between women and men is however
not statistically significant according to the baseline regression for the full sample (both
women and men) with an interaction term between Gender and Housework (specific
results not provided in this thesis).
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Table 2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Females Males
Housework -0.0027** -0.0022** -0.0021 -0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0016)
Cohabiting 0.0331** 0.0429**
(0.0148) (0.0195)
Education 0.0227*** 0.0272***
(0.0031) (0.0036)
Experience 0.0142*** 0.0161***
(0.0021) (0.0024)
Experience2 -0.000183*** -0.000196***
(0.00005) (0.00005)
City 0.0903*** 0.0829***
(0.0139) (0.0176)
Full time 0.0750** 0.0992*
(0.0301) (0.0511)
Public sector -0.0786*** -0.1450***
(0.0137) (0.0184)
Children 0.0328** 0.0366*
(0.0157) (0.0195)
Qualified work 0.1780*** 0.2600***
(0.0152) (0.0188)
Constant 5.0320*** 4.3280*** 5.1530*** 4.3040***
(0.0186) (0.0510) (0.0188) (0.0694)
Observations 1100 1100 1180 1180
R-squared 0.0040 0.3930 0.0010 0.4290
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of before-tax hourly wage. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
33
Next the analysis is extended by considering the working conditions channel,
results reported in Table 3, where the baseline regression results are also in-
cluded for comparison. What the working condition channels are supposed
to test is the hypothesis that men and women who do much housework will
choose jobs that are easier to combine with housework and that these jobs
carry a wage penalty (the selection hypothesis). Thus the expected effect, is
that the inclusion of working conditions reduces the negative wage effect of
housework in the baseline regression. This channel is investigated in three
ways; first a control for jobs with a higher degree of flexible hours is in-
cluded (columns 2 and 6), second controls for specific working conditions are
included (columns 3 and 7), and finally a profession effect is controlled for
(columns 4 and 8).
Starting with the High flexibility variable, it seems that jobs with a high
degree of flexible hours have positive and significant effect on both women’s
and men’s wages, contrary to the expected effect. The inclusion of High flex-
ibility also further enhances the wage penalty of housework for women but
reduces it for men. Indicating that the housework wage penalty for women is
not explained by the selection into jobs that are more compatible with house-
work, while a part of the housework wage penalty for men can be explained
by selection into flexible jobs, however the estimates for men are not sta-
tistically significant. Furthermore, these results should be interpreted with
some caution, since the number of observations is greatly reduced and there
could possibly be some kind of selection bias from who answered the question.
The second control is specific working conditions, such as stress at work and
heavy lifting. The inclusion of these working condition variables does have
the expected effect on housework for women, where the wage reduction of
housework is now 0.16 %, giving some support to the idea that women choose
jobs with compensating wage differentials in response to greater housework
responsibilities, but the reduction is not enough to conclude that the selec-
tion hypothesis holds. The results for men are reversed, the housework wage
penalty is enhanced when controlling for specific working conditions, however
the estimates are not statistically significant.
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Table 3: Selection hypothesis results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Females Males
VARIABLES Baseline Baseline
Housework -0.0022** -0.0035** -0.0016* -0.0020** -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.00010) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0016)
High flexibility 0.0898*** 0.0750***
(0.0202) (0.0204)
Heavy lifts 0.0481** -0.0416**
(0.0237) (0.0178)
Physically demanding -0.0712*** -0.0543***
(0.0130) (0.0166)
Mentally demanding 0.0220 0.0515***
(0.0141) (0.0156)
Stressful work -0.0070 0.0333**
(0.0151) (0.0163)
Monotonous work -0.0679*** -0.0541***
(0.0153) (0.0170)
Mental work 0.0257* 0.0458**
(0.0141) (0.0189)
Emotionally demanding -0.0589*** -0.1700***
(0.0154) (0.0287)
Constant 4.3280*** 4.2320*** 4.3830*** 4.4100*** 4.3040*** 4.1950*** 4.3580*** 4.5170***
(0.0510) (0.0772) (0.0540) (0.0537) (0.0694) (0.0992) (0.0749) (0.0886)
Profession effect NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 1100 664 1100 1100 1180 774 1180 1180
R-squared 0.3930 0.4460 0.4300 0.5190 0.429 0.4230 0.4660 0.5360
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of before-tax hourly wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard control variables (Education, Experience and its square,
City, Full time, Public sector, Children and Qualified work) are included in all regressions but suppressed from table.
Finally, working conditions are controlled for through a Profession effect,
where profession is controlled for with two digits precision.17 When includ-
ing the Profession effect, Housework remains significant for women and its
effect becomes somewhat less negative. Thus, it seems that some of the neg-
ative effect of housework on women’s wages found in the baseline regressions
is explained by a pure profession effect, however a large part of the negative
association on women’s wages remains. For men, there is essentially no dif-
ference between the estimate from the baseline regression and the regression
including the Profession effect and yet again the housework wage penalty
is not statistically significant. These are similar to the results presented in
Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) who do not find that controlling for occupa-
tion reduces the negative effect of housework.
The second hypothesis on how housework can affect wages is through reduced
effort, which here is assumed to manifests itself as a worsening of individ-
ual health in effort related variables, e.g. feelings of fatigue (i.e. the health
channel). Thus, what is expected is that when health variables are included,
they should have a negative effect on wages and they should reduce the neg-
ative effect of housework on women’s wages. The results are presented in
Table 4, in which one can see that the only health variable that is statisti-
cally significant is Fatigue. The inclusion of health variables does not appear
to change the effect of housework, since its coefficient remains more or less
unchanged in magnitude for both men and women. Thus, for our sample
the health channel does not seem to account for the effect of housework on
wages. However, the lack of support for the effort hypothesis can be a result
of that the variables included here do a less than perfect job of accounting for
reduced effort. For example, consider the Fatigue variable, a general sense
of fatigue could of course be a result of housework as well as the result of
one’s work, therefore we cannot be certain in which way the included health
variables are affected, i.e. if they are an outcome from one’s workload or
from one’s housework responsibilities.
17 The two digit profession categories are in accordance with the Nordic occupation clas-
sification system (NYK85) which in turn is based on the International Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations (ISCO).
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Table 4: Effort hypothesis results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Females Males
VARIABLES Baseline Baseline
Housework -0.0022** -0.0022** -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Fatigue -0.0278* -0.0358*
(0.0149) (0.0203)
Stomach -0.0068 -0.0227
(0.0146) (0.0251)
Headache -0.0090 -0.0224
(0.0138) (0.0157)
Sleep 0.0046 -0.0106
(0.0178) (0.0235)
Overwork 0.0151 0.0167
(0.0268) (0.0340)
Constant 4.3280*** 4.3440*** 4.3040*** 4.3280***
(0.0510) (0.0522) (0.0694) (0.0686)
Observations 1100 1100 1180 1180
R-squared 0.3930 0.3950 0.4290 0.4340
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of before-tax hourly
wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard control variables (Education,
Experience and its square, City, Full time, Public sector, Children and
Qualified work) are included in all regressions but suppressed from table.
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IV results
In this section the results from the instrumental variable (IV) regressions are
presented. As mentioned earlier, the application of IV is conducted in this
study in attempt to reduce the endogeneity of housework.
The chosen instrument in this study is the opinion that time spent on house-
work should be equally distributed within couples. As previously described,
we argue that ones opinion about the distribution of housework should affect
the time spent on housework but not necessarily affect ones wage directly or
indirectly (through any other covariate than housework). It should however
be clarified that there is a risk of individuals stating their housework equality
opinion with their own time spent on housework in mind, thus the unrevealed
preferences and the endogeneity of housework prevails. This will most likely
cause downward biased estimates as described in the methodology section.
Table 5 shows the first stage regressions where Housework is regressed on
Equality opinion. The F-values for females and males are around the rule-of-
thumb value 10, thus the instrument is on the verge of suffering from weak
instrument issues.
Table 5: First stage regressions
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Females Males
Equality opinion -1.1900*** 1.0270***
(0.3960) (0.2790)
Constant 13.4800*** 7.6340***
(0.2970) (0.1890)
Observations 1100 1180
R-squared 0.0080 0.0110
F-value 9.0300 13.5900
Dependent variable is Housework. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Knowing that women on average spend more time on housework than men,
the coefficients of the first stage regressions have the expected signs. More
specifically, women who endorse equality do approximately 1.2 hours less
housework on average and men who endorse equality do approximately 1
more hour of housework on average.
Table 6 shows the results from the IV regressions in comparison to the OLS
baselines. For females, the magnitude of the coefficient for housework in the
IV specification is more than 10 times larger than in the OLS specification.
Under the assumption of a valid instrument, this indicates that there is a
negative (although not statistically significant) causal effect of time spent on
housework on wages for women, an effect that is much larger than shown in
the OLS regression. The conclusion regarding the IV estimate of housework
is evidently limited by the fact that the coefficient is not statistically sig-
nificant. Nevertheless, it is perhaps even more limited by the fact that the
validity of the instrument can be questioned. It may be that the IV estimates
are downward biased as described in the methodology section, and since the
estimated wage penalties in the IV regressions are substantially larger than
the OLS estimates, one may suspect that the weak correlation between the
instrument and housework (see F-values in Table 5) have enhanced the bias.
If we for a moment assume that the instrument in fact is valid, it is worth to
comment on the large difference in magnitude of the effect between OLS and
IV. What in this case drives the difference is difficult to pinpoint. Although,
it seems so that the anticipated downward bias from simultaneous causality
(high wage leads to less housework) in the OLS specification is not true,
instead it may be that a high wage leads to more housework and thus causes
an upward bias of the OLS estimate. Omitted variable bias may also be the
reason for the difference between the OLS and IV estimate, it is possible
that unobserved ’ability’ is positively correlated with both time spent on
housework and wages and thus omitting this covariate in the OLS regression
causes an upward bias of the housework effect. However, again, because of
the large difference between OLS and IV the most likely situation is that the
instrument fails to account for the endogeneity of housework.
39
Table 6: IV results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Females Males
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Housework -0.0022** -0.0276 -0.0013 -0.0199
(0.0010) (0.0263) (0.0016) (0.0223)
Cohabiting 0.0331** 0.0159 0.0429** -0.0167
(0.0148) (0.0256) (0.0195) (0.0738)
Education 0.0227*** 0.0203*** 0.0272*** 0.0293***
(0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0045)
Experience 0.0142*** 0.0176*** 0.0161*** 0.0177***
(0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0033)
Experience2 -0.000183*** -0.000210*** -0.000196*** -0.000229***
(0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007)
City 0.0903*** 0.0613* 0.0829*** 0.0960***
(0.0139) (0.0339) (0.0176) (0.0237)
Full time 0.0750** 0.0587 0.0992* 0.1030**
(0.0301) (0.0381) (0.0511) (0.0499)
Public sector -0.0786*** -0.0718*** -0.1450*** -0.1320***
(0.0137) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0246)
Children 0.0328** 0.1560 0.0366* 0.0729
(0.0157) (0.1300) (0.0195) (0.0463)
Qualified work 0.1780*** 0.1430*** 0.2600*** 0.2480***
(0.0152) (0.0404) (0.0188) (0.0246)
Constant 4.3280*** 4.6200*** 4.3040*** 4.4310***
(0.0510) (0.3090) (0.0694) (0.1700)
Observations 1100 1100 1180 1180
R-squared 0.3930 0.0740 0.4290 0.3670
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of before-tax hourly wage. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Threshold analysis and matching
So far, time spent on housework have been considered to be a continuous
variable and thus the effect of housework has been assumed to be linear in
the previous analysis. Since some amount of housework is a necessary part
of essentially all people’s life, which is recognised by both employers and em-
ployees, it may be that the significant negative impact of housework on wages
starts at some threshold above the ’normal’ time people spend on housework
(Hersch and Stratton 1997; Hersch 2009). To gain a better understanding of
the effect of housework on wages for different levels of time spent on house-
work, the baseline OLS regression is conducted with dummy variables for
each 2 hour interval in the span [0,40], using the interval 0-2 hours as refer-
ence level. The resulting effects of housework at different levels, compared to
the level of 0-2 hours, are graphically illustrated in Figure 1 together with the
frequency distributions across the housework hours range. It is clear that the
distribution for men is more skewed towards few housework hours, however
the distribution for both women and men peaks at the 8-10 hour category.
Figure 1: Threshold effects
Note: Patterned bars indicate significant effects (on at least the 10 % level)
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There is a persistent negative association between housework and wages
across all intervals for women while the housework effect for men is more
irregular. Nevertheless, it seems like the negative impact of housework on
wages begins after 18 hours for men. Similarly for women, after the 18 hours
threshold, the negative impact is notably increased. 18
Based on these results, the OLS regressions are re-specified to include a
dummy variable of housework which takes the value 1 if housework hours are
larger than or equal to 18 hours and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in
Table 7 from which it is clear that spending more than 18 hours of house-
work a week is associated with a large wage penalty for both women and
men. However, the negative effect is approximately twice as large for men
compared to women. The difference in the housework effect between women
and men is statistically significant at the 10 % level as shown in Table 8
where the full sample is used to run the baseline regression including an in-
teraction term between the housework dummy and gender. These results
provide an important illustration of the gender difference in the housework
wage penalty which may partly explain why women still perform more house-
work than men (since women suffer less of a wage penalty than men do).
The results presented in this section so far may be biased due to endogeneity
of housework in the same way as previous OLS regressions. The IV strat-
egy applied above cannot be used when housework is defined as a threshold
because the first stage regressions are close to non-existent.19
18 Note that in Figure 1 the large positive (and significant) effect for men in the category
with an upper limit of 34 hours is based on a single observation.
19 In the first stage regressions the F-value for females is 1.56 and the F-value for males is
0.21.
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Table 7: Housework as a dummy
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Females Males
Housework dummy -0.0540*** -0.1110***
(0.0152) (0.0365)
Cohabiting 0.0313** 0.0359*
(0.0150) (0.0192)
Education 0.0228*** 0.0271***
(0.0031) (0.0036)
Experience 0.0141*** 0.0162***
(0.0021) (0.0024)
Experience2 -0.000182*** -0.000196***
(0.00005) (0.00005)
City 0.0904*** 0.0823***
(0.0138) (0.0174)
Full time 0.0709** 0.0994**
(0.0289) (0.0500)
Public sector -0.0784*** -0.1460***
(0.0137) (0.0181)
Children 0.0337** 0.0373*
(0.0155) (0.0192)
Qualified work 0.1770*** 0.2590***
(0.0151) (0.0186)
Constant 4.3160*** 4.3030***
(0.0508) (0.0684)
Observations 1100 1180
R-squared 0.3960 0.4340
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of
before-tax hourly wage. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
43
Table 8: Difference in housework effect between females and males
(1)
VARIABLES
Housework dummy -0.1140***
(0.0357)
Housework dummy*Female 0.0647*
(0.0389)
Constant 4.3750***
(0.0449)
Observations 2280
R-squared 0.4400
Dependent variable is the logarithm of before-
tax hourly wage. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard control vari-
ables (Education, Experience and its square,
City, Full time, Public sector, Children and
Qualified work) are included in the regression
but suppressed from table.
In order to reduce the potential endogeneity of the housework dummy, propen-
sity score matching is applied as described in the methodology section. In the
process of defining control and treatment group based on propensity score,
5 blocks are identified within the range of propensity score common support
for females [0.0490, 0.5733] (see Appendix C Figure 2). For males, 3 blocks
are identified within the range of propensity score common support [0.0095,
0.2118] (see Appendix C Figure 3). In these blocks, the balancing property
is satisfied for both females and males.
The results from the different matching procedures described in the method-
ology section are reported in Table 9 (Panel A for females and Panel B for
males). Looking at the nearest-neighbour estimates for the average treat-
ment effect on the treated for women, it differs quite a bit from the other
methods. This could be a result of the nearest neighbour not being very
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near and thus leading to bad matches. The nearest-neighbour estimate for
women is also the only estimate which is not statistically significant and the
number of controls used are very few compared to the other methods. The
wage penalty for women who do 18 hours or more is statistically significant
and of the same magnitude for both radius and Kernel matching. What the
results indicate is that women who do 18 hours or more of housework have
6.2-7.6 % lower wages, hence the estimated negative effect of housework is
larger using matching compared to the OLS estimate of approximately 5.4
%.20 For men the effects from all three matching methods are statistically
significant, and indicate that men who do 18 hours or more of housework
have 13.5-20.4 % lower wages, which once again is larger in magnitude than
the 11.1 % estimated by OLS.21
The different matching methods yield more varying estimates for men than
for women. This may be due to that men have worse common support
properties (see Appendix C) with fewer treated observations than untreated
observations, especially in the upper part of the propensity score scale. This
could actually affect the estimates from all matching method. Thus, there is
an increased risk of bad matches. Nevertheless, all estimates from the match-
ing procedure points in the same direction (except the nearest-neighbour es-
timate for women), namely a larger wage penalty than observed using OLS.
However, it should be re-stated that all matching strategies are essentially a
form of control strategy, and thus any hidden bias caused by latent variables
may still persist after matching. For example, if persons who do 18 hours
or more housework per week have some unobserved common characteristic
which affects wage negatively, the matching estimates will be downward bi-
ased.
The choice to employ the matching strategy was an attempt to reduce the
endogeneity of housework, which was also the aim of the IV strategy previ-
ously used. It is noteworthy that the results from both of these two methods
suggests that the estimated wage penalty from housework is greater than the
estimates provided by OLS. This can either be due to that the bias of these
methods works in the same direction, or that the OLS estimates are upward
biased.
20 OLS estimates from Table 7
21 Once again compare with OLS estimates from Table 7
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Table 9: Matching results
Panel A: Females
Matching Method No. treated No. untreated ATT t-stat
Nearest-neighbour 216 177 -0.0070 -0.2460
(0.0280)
Radius (0.1) 216 822 -0.0760 -4.2730
(0.0180)
Radius (0.01) 213 822 -0.0700 -4.0660
(0.0170)
Radius (0.001) 190 510 -0.0630 -2.5300
(0.0250)
Kernel 216 822 -0.0620 -3.4070
(0.0180)
Panel B: Males
Nearest-neighbour 55 53 -0.1860 -2.5840
(0.0720)
Radius (0.1) 55 1056 -0.1410 -3.4940
(0.0400)
Radius (0.01) 55 1054 -0.1950 -5.5320
(0.0350)
Radius (0.001) 49 730 -0.2040 -4.4040
(0.0460)
Kernel 55 1056 -0.1350 -3.3580
(0.0400)
Dependent variable is the logarithm of before-tax hourly wage. Treatment is doing
18 hours or more of housework. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Note:
The number of treated and untreated refer to actual matches within each method.
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Summary and concluding remarks
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of time spent on house-
work on wages for women and men in Sweden. In the OLS regressions,
where housework is treated as a continuous variable, we find that time spent
on housework has a negative association with wages for both women and
men. For women, spending one more hour of housework per week is associ-
ated with approximately 0.2 % decrease in hourly wage, an effect which is
statistically significant on the 5 % level. For men, the wage penalty from
housework is somewhat smaller and not statistically significant. These re-
sults are in line with results from previous studies (e.g. Hersch 1991a, 1991b;
Hersch and Stratton 1997) which have found a significant negative effect of
housework on wages for women, while the results for men have been mixed.
In order to evaluate the selection and effort hypotheses originating from
Becker (1985), variables which are assumed to be channels for the housework
effect are added to the OLS regressions, i.e. working conditions and health
variables, respectively. We find little support for either of the hypotheses,
i.e. neither is the housework wage penalty explained by that some individ-
uals select low wage jobs which are more compatible with housework, nor is
the housework wage penalty explained by reduced effort in terms of stress
related health symptoms. These results are in line with previous research
(Hersch 2009; Stratton 2001; Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz 2011) which finds weak
support for the selection and effort hypotheses. More specifically, our results
show that a statistically significant negative impact of housework on wages
prevail for women even though potential channels are accounted for, while
the housework effect for men is inconclusive due to lack of statistical signif-
icance. The results indicate that there is an autonomous negative effect of
housework on wages which is unrelated to occupational compensating differ-
entials or reduced effort. Since women still perform more housework than
men on average, the allocation of housework within households may partly
explain the persistence of the gender wage gap. Nevertheless, it is not certain
that the channel variables used in this thesis perfectly capture the essence
of the hypotheses. For example, it is difficult to isolate potential reduced
effort stemming from performing housework. The health measurements used
in this study may capture reduced effort stemming from other parts of life
or from unobservable characteristics.
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The results from the OLS regressions do not provide a casual interpretation
of the impact of housework on wages, mainly due to potential simultaneous
causality and omitted variable bias. The main concern is that the OLS es-
timates suffer from downward bias and thus indicate a much more severe
wage penalty from housework than is actually the case. The application of
IV regressions in this study are meant to reduce this potential bias. The
IV estimates contradicts the initial suspicion of downward biased OLS es-
timates. Under the assumption of a valid instrument, the housework wage
penalty for women is 2.8 % and 2.0 % for men, which is more than 10 times
more negative than the OLS estimates. However, the instrument is not good
enough to ensure that endogeneity have been mitigated. In fact, the large
deviation between the IV and OLS estimates indicate that the potential bias
of the IV estimate is enhanced by weakness of the instrument. Even though
we cannot stipulate the direction of the bias induced by endogeneity in the
OLS estimate, we are convinced that potential endogeneity is blurring the
picture when it comes to the wage penalty from housework. It is in fact a
major issue which has not been dealt with properly in previous literature.
More specifically, we have a hard time accepting previous conclusions about
housework being exogenous (Hersch and Stratton 1997; Bryan and Sevilla-
Sanz 2011).
In order to improve the analysis of the housework effect on wages, we relax
the assumption of linearity in housework and turn to potential threshold ef-
fects where the threshold for housework is defined as 18 hours per week for
both men and women. The OLS estimates of the housework threshold effect
shows that doing more than 18 hours of housework per week is associated
with statistically significant wage penalties of 5.4 % for women and 11.1 %
for men. Thus, men who spend a large part of their time doing housework re-
ceive a more than twice as large wage penalty than women. The difference in
the housework threshold effect between men and women is also statistically
significant at the 10 % level. The underlying reasons for the difference may be
similar to those often referred to in studies regarding the wage penalty from
parental leave (see for example Albrecht et al 1999) which has to do with
signaling. Men who take on a large part of the family and household respon-
sibility may signal to their employers that they are less committed to their
careers than men who act more according to gender norms. While women
who take on the same degree of responsibility do not signal less career com-
mitment since it is an expected female behaviour. Nevertheless, household
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work is a much more ’hidden’ activity than parental leave so the presumed
signal may be significantly weaker. Whatever the underlying reason is, the
results may provide an explanation for why fewer men than women take on
the majority of the household responsibility. However, the fraction of men
who engage in 18 hours or more housework is small which makes it difficult to
draw conclusions about the mechanism which determines the gender division
of housework in general.
In order to verify and reduce endogeneity bias of the OLS estimates of house-
work threshold effects, propensity score matching is applied. The results
from various matching techniques implies that the wage penalty from spend-
ing more than 18 hours per week on housework (the average treatment effect
for the treated) is larger than the OLS estimates for both women and men.
Thus, the results from the matching strategy indicate that the OLS estimates
in fact are upward biased, although we cannot know for sure that this is the
case because of limitations to matching method.
Further research which effectively deals with the endogeneity of housework
is needed in order to determine its true effect on wages. The true underlying
reasons for the persistent observed negative effect of housework on wages
(especially for women) also needs further clarification. This kind of inves-
tigation requires more sophisticated measurements of housework effort and
jobs which are compatible with housework.
This thesis sheds light on the relationship between housework and wages
in Sweden using specifications of methods, which attempts to account for
endogeneity of housework, which has not been applied in any other study of
our knowledge before. However, the complexion of the relationship prevails
since the applied methods cannot fully replicate total randomisation of time
spent on housework (treatment). Nevertheless, our results indicate that there
is a persistent negative effect of housework on wages for women. From a
society point of view, one may draw the conclusion that policies designed to
ease women’s housework load are needed in order to enable women to unfold
their full earnings potential. Such policies are already well-established in
Sweden, such as public childcare and the more recent introduction of tax
reductions for housework purchases. Perhaps, the only way of dealing with
the negative impact of housework on wages is for couples to equally bear the
burden within households. However, this is a normative challenge yet to be
49
resolved.
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Appendix
A. Difference in means
Table 10: t-tests for difference in means
VARIABLES Females Males Difference
Dependent variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Wage 153.9493 50.0836 180.9051 73.4482 26.9558***
Standard wage determinants
Cohabiting 0.7309 0.4437 0.7085 0.4547 -0.0224
City 0.3636 0.4813 0.3203 0.4668 -0.0433**
Children 0.5236 0.4997 0.4703 0.4993 -0.0533**
Education 14.0227 3.1340 13.5898 2.9410 -0.4329***
Experience 21.0364 12.3416 21.3576 13.1788 0.3212
Full time 0.9782 0.1462 0.9703 0.1697 -0.0079*
Public sector 0.5573 0.4969 0.2534 0.4351 -0.3039***
Qualified work 0.4809 0.4999 0.4559 0.4983 -0.0250
Explanatory variable of interest
Housework 12.8109 6.5419 8.1072 4.7970 -4.7037***
Housework dummy 0.1964 0.3974 0.0466 0.2109 -0.1498***
Health channel - effort hypothesis
Fatigue 0.2718 0.4451 0.1602 0.3669 -0.1116***
Stomach 0.2073 0.4055 0.1288 0.3351 -0.0785***
Headache 0.5182 0.4999 0.3805 0.4857 -0.1377***
Sleep 0.2191 0.4138 0.1305 0.3370 -0.0886***
Overwork 0.0718 0.2583 0.0407 0.1976 -0.0311***
Working conditions channel -
selection hypothesis
High flexibility? 0.3178 0.466 0.4483 0.4976 0.1305***
Heavy lift 0.0791 0.2700 0.1915 0.3937 0.1124***
Physically demanding 0.4427 0.4969 0.4051 0.4911 -0.0376*
Mentally demanding 0.6364 0.4813 0.5711 0.4951 -0.0653***
Stressful work 0.7673 0.4228 0.7322 0.4430 -0.0351*
Monotonic work 0.1746 0.3798 0,1966 0,3976 0.0220
Mental work 0.3036 0.4600 0.2271 0.4192 -0.0765***
Emotionally demanding 0.2273 0.4193 0.0525 0.2232 -0.1748***
Instrument
Equality opinion 0.5609 0.4965 0.4610 0.4987 -0.0999***
Sample size 1100 1180
Note: ?number of observations: 664 for women and 774 for men. The difference is calculated as
mean males - mean females. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B. Variable description
Table 11: List of variables
VARIABLES Description
Wage Hourly before-tax wage in SEK.
Log wage Logarithm of hourly before-tax wage in SEK.
City Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual lives in a
metropolitan area according to classification in LNU 2010
(Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmoe/Lund/Trelleborg).
Education Total years of education (from 1st grade).
Experience Total years of paid employment.
Full time Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual were em-
ployed full time in 2009.
Public sector Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual cur-
rently works in the public sector.
Qualified work Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual’s occu-
pation is qualified work.
Cohabiting Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is mar-
ried or cohabitant.
Children Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has
children living at home.
Housework Hours spent on housework per week, is a composite vari-
able based on the number of hours the individual spends on
cleaning, doing laundry and cooking/doing the dishes/food
shopping, authors’ calculation.
Fatigue Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”During the last 12 months have
you experienced a feeling of general fatigue?”.
Stomach Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”During the last 12 months have
you experienced stomach pain?”.
Headache Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”During the last 12 months have
you experienced headaches or migraine?”.
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Sleep Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”During the last 12 months have
you had troubles sleeping?”.
Overwork Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”During the last 12 months have
you experienced a feeling of overwork?”.
High flexibility Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has a
high degree of flexible working hours, defined as possibility
to move working hours several hours or days.
Heavy lift Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual needs
to lifts 60 kg or more to do his/her job daily or several times
a week.
Physically demanding Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”Is your type of work physically
demanding in anyway?”.
Mentally demanding Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”Is your work mentally demand-
ing?”.
Stressful work Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”Is your work stressful?”.
Monotonous work Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual an-
swered yes to the question ”Is your work monotonous?”.
Mental work Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual most
of the time or all of the time has to work near the peak of
his/her ability, has to use a lot of mental effort.
Emotionally demanding Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual most
of the time or all of the time has to work with emotionally
demanding tasks.
Profession? Dummy variable for occupation classes with two digits preci-
sion, based on Nordic Classification of Occupation (NYK85).
Equality opinion Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual strongly
supports to the statement ”What do you think about the
suggestion of committing to a society where men take the
same amount of responsibility for children and housework
as women?”.
Source: Swedish level-of-living survey (LNU) 2010 and Nordic Classification of Occupation
(NYK85) for variables marked with ?.
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C. Common support of matching
Figure 2: Common support for females
Figure 3: Common support for males
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